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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      
 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 This appeal requires us to determine whether a portion 
of an arbitration award should be struck down on the ground that 
the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority.  Because we 
find that the arbitrator's response did not exceed the scope of 
the question presented, we will affirm the district court's 
decision upholding the arbitration award. 
 I. 
 The facts of the case are undisputed.  On or about 
February 7, 1992, United Parcel Service ("UPS") discharged Thomas 
Varish for poor work performance.  Thereafter, the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, 
Local Union No. 430 (the "Union") filed a grievance on behalf of 
Varish under the procedures set forth in the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement (the "Agreement").  After UPS and the Union 
were unable to reach an accord with respect to Varish's 
discharge, the parties submitted the dispute to the Central 
  
Pennsylvania Area Parcel Grievance Committee (the "Joint Panel" 
or "Panel")1, as required by the Agreement. 
 At the hearing before the Joint Panel, the Union 
representative presenting Varish's case raised a Point of Order 
challenging UPS's attempt to introduce into evidence notations of 
informal disciplinary actions previously taken against Varish.  
These informal actions are typically referred to as "talk-with's" 
and "talk-to's," which are verbal reprimands or comments, or 
"write-up's," which are written records of reprimands or 
comments.2  The Panel considered the Point of Order, but could 
not resolve the issue.  Accordingly, the Panel issued the 
following decision: 
 
A Point of Order was raised and Executive Session was 
called.  The Panel deadlocked on the Point of Order.  
The question is whether [UPS] may enter into the 
record, "talk-with's," "talk-to's" or "write-up's" 
which [sic] the Union had no prior knowledge. 
 As required by the parties' Agreement, the parties 
submitted the Point of Order to an arbitrator.  After hearing two 
days of testimony and reviewing post-arbitration briefs, 
                     
 
   1The Joint Panel is composed of equal numbers of UPS and 
Union representatives.  The Union representatives cannot be from 
the local Union involved in the dispute, and the UPS 
representatives cannot be from the UPS district involved in the 
dispute.  Thus, the local Union and UPS district present their 
cases to a disinterested panel.  Appendix ("App.") at 77. 
    
2For the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to all three 
categories of informal actions as "talk-to's."   
  
Arbitrator Eli Rock rendered an award and opinion in this matter.  
The two paragraph award reads as follows: 
 
1. On the general question of the admissibility of 
talk-to's and the like before the Joint Panel where the 
Union members object, the ruling is that such material 
may not be admitted over the objection of the Union 
members. 
 
2. In the present particular case involving employee 
Varish, and limited to the present submission to 
arbitration, the disputed material may be admitted. 
 In his memorandum detailing his decision, Arbitrator 
Rock explained his analytical process as follows: 
 Addressing myself to [the Point of Order], it 
appears to me that I have no choice, in this case but 
to break down the issue into the broader and general 
question of [UPS]'s right to introduce "talk-with's" 
and the like over the Union's objections, and secondly 
[UPS]'s right to do so in the present specific case, 
involving grievant Tom Varish. 
App. at 59.  In the context of the question presented, i.e., the 
admissibility of talk-to's of which the Union had no prior 
knowledge, the arbitrator, in making his first "general" ruling, 
gave "significant weight" to the past practice of the parties.  
He found it to be "completely clear . . . that where the Union 
members have opposed the admission of `talk-to's,' and have stuck 
to that position, such items have not been entered in the 
record." (Id. at 60).3  In regard to this particular case, 
                     
    
3Some confusion exists in the record concerning the scope of 
Arbitrator Rock's award.  This confusion arises because, in the 
decision accompanying the arbitrator's award, Arbitrator Rock 
references objections raised by "Union panel members."  See App. 
60-61.  However, the question presented to the Arbitrator 
involved objections raised by Union members, not Union panel 
  
however, the arbitrator determined that both Varish and the Union 
had had prior knowledge of the talk-to's.  Id. at 61.  The 
arbitrator found therefore in his second paragraph that the talk-
to's here should have been admitted. 
 UPS sought to vacate paragraph one of the arbitrator's 
award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded the contractual 
limitations on his authority by ruling on an issue not submitted 
for arbitration and by altering the parties' underlying 
Agreement.4  The parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment, and the district court entered an order granting the 
Union's motion and denying UPS's.  This appeal followed.5    
                                                                  
members.  Because the arbitrator's decision and award must be 
considered in light of the question presented, and because the 
award itself is free from any ambiguity in language, we find that 
the arbitrator's award properly addressed objections raised by 
Union members. 
    
4It should be noted that the parties have not appealed the 
arbitrator's second finding, namely that, in Varish's specific 
case, the disputed material was admissible. 
    
5On appeal, UPS also raises, for the first time, a public 
policy challenge to paragraph one of the arbitrator's award.  It 
is the general rule that issues raised for the first time at the 
appellate level will not be reviewed.  See, e.g., Singleton v. 
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 
552, 556 (1941).  Even were this Court to exercise its discretion 
and reach the issue, however, UPS's public policy challenge to 
paragraph one would clearly fail. 
 Although a court may refuse to enforce an arbitrator's 
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement if the 
interpretation "explicitly conflict[s] with well-defined, 
dominant public policy," Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1441 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 660 (1992), UPS fails to 
articulate a well-defined public policy violated by paragraph one 
of the award, particularly when the award is interpreted, as we 
  
 II. 
 We exercise plenary review of the district court's 
decision resolving cross-motions for summary judgment.  See 
Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1440 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
113 S.Ct. 660 (1992). 
 III. 
 It is well settled that courts have limited power to 
review a labor arbitrator's award.  Where, as here, the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement provides for binding arbitration 
in grievance proceedings, courts are not authorized to reconsider 
the merits of an arbitrator's award.  A contrary rule would 
undermine the federal policy which favors settling labor disputes 
through arbitration.  See United Paperworkers International Union 
v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987); United Steelworkers of 
America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 
(1960).  Therefore, an arbitrator's award will be upheld so long 
as it "draws its essence from the collective bargaining 
agreement," Misco, 484 U.S. at 36; Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 
597, unless the award is tainted by fraud or bias or addresses 
matters outside the arbitrator's authority.  High Concrete 
Structures, Inc. v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 
Local 166, 879 F.2d 1215, 1218 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Mobil Oil 
                                                                  
do here, to exclude only talk-to's about which the Union had no 
prior knowledge. 
  
Corp. v. Independent Oil Workers Union, 679 F.2d 299, 302 (3d 
Cir. 1982) ("[A]n arbitrator must not exceed his authority and 
dispense his own brand of industrial justice.").   
 UPS raises two intertwined issues in its appeal:  that 
paragraph one of the arbitrator's award exceeds the scope of his 
authority and that it does not draw its essence from the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement.6  UPS argues that we should not 
uphold paragraph one of the award because the arbitrator failed 
to confine his inquiry to the "grievance coming before him," 
namely the admissibility of talk-to's about which the Union had 
no prior knowledge.  In UPS's view, paragraph one of the award 
holds that all talk-to's, regardless of whether the Union had 
prior knowledge, may not be admitted over the objection of the 
Union members.   
 In support of this interpretation, UPS cites two 
passages contained in Arbitrator Rock's memorandum accompanying 
the arbitration award.  First, UPS points to a passage in which 
Arbitrator Rock states that "[t]he Union panel members could in a 
specific future case simply object to the introduction of `talk-
                     
    
6Under Article 48, Section 2 of the parties' Agreement: 
 
The arbitrator shall have the authority to apply the 
provisions of this Agreement, and to render a decision 
on any grievance coming before him, but shall not have 
the authority to amend or modify this Agreement or 
establish new terms and conditions under this 
Agreement. 
 
(emphasis added). 
 
  
to's' as such, without regard to the prior processing or handling 
of such material, and given the above past practice [of the Joint 
Panel] and the weight that I have given to it, this would be 
sufficient to bar the introduction of such material."  App. at 
61.  UPS argues that, in using this language, the arbitrator 
ruled on the admissibility of all talk-to's, whether or not the 
Union had had prior knowledge of them, and therefore the 
arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority.    
 UPS also points to references in Arbitrator Rock's 
memorandum to objections raised by "Union panel members" (App. at 
60-61) as evidence that the arbitrator exceeded his authority.  
UPS properly contends that the question presented to Arbitrator 
Rock did not involve objections raised by union panel members, 
but rather by union members appearing before the panel.7 
 A review of Arbitrator Rock's award, however, persuades 
us that the award did not exceed the scope of his authority and 
that thereby, pursuant to Article 48, Section 2 of the parties' 
agreement, the award drew its essence from the agreement.  To 
begin with, it is crucial to consider the arbitrator's award in 
light of the question presented.  Accordingly the arbitrator's 
award should be read to address only those talk-to's of which the 
Union did not have prior knowledge and only those objections 
raised by Union members.  
                     
    
7See footnote 3, supra. 
  
 Additionally, UPS's interpretation of paragraph one of 
the award is not suggested by the language of the award itself.  
In drawing the inference that paragraph one exceeds the scope of 
the question presented, UPS relies solely upon the language 
contained in the arbitrator's accompanying opinion.  The Supreme 
Court, however, has clearly held that ambiguity in an opinion 
accompanying an award is not a reason for determining that an 
award is unenforceable as beyond the scope of the arbitrator's 
authority.  United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & 
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).  Instead, when an award does 
not apparently exceed the scope of the parties' submission, it 
will be affirmed, regardless of inferences that may be drawn from 
the accompanying opinion.  Id.  Such an award will, of course, be 
enforceable only to the extent it does not exceed the scope of 
the parties' submission.  Thus, given two reasonable 
interpretations of the award, only that which is within the 
authority of the arbitrator will be enforceable. 
  In the instant case, the arbitrator's award, on its 
face, does not contain any language indicating that it extends 
beyond the scope of the question presented.  Rather, paragraph 
one is logically read as a direct response to the parties' 
submission, pertaining only to talk-to's about which the Union 
had no prior knowledge.8   Accordingly, the award is not beyond 
                     
    
8Not only is this a logical reading of the award, but it is 
also a preferable reading insofar as it eliminates the inherent 
contradiction found in the parties' suggested reading of the 
award.  Specifically, if paragraph one of the award were read to 
  
the scope of the arbitrator's authority under the parties' 
Agreement. 
 The judgment of March 24, 1994, will be affirmed. 
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ROSENN, Circuit Judge, Dissenting.  
 This appeal stems from an arbitration proceeding held 
in response to a specific submission by the parties.  The 
submission simply asked the arbitrator to decide a procedural 
question relating to the admissibility of notations of prior 
informal disciplinary actions ("talk to's") taken against a 
discharged employee at a hearing before a joint mediation panel 
considering the discharge of that employee.  The submission by 
the Joint Panel asked "whether the Company may enter into the 
record [before the Panel] 'talk-withs,' 'talk-to's' or 'write-
ups' which [sic] the Union had no prior knowledge."  (Emphasis 
added). 
 The arbitrator decided that "[i]n the present 
particular case . . . and limited to the present submission to 
                                                                  
mean that all talk-to's are inadmissible upon the Union's 
objection, paragraph two's holding that the talk-to's in the 
present case are admissible would be rendered illogical and 
inconsistent.   
  
arbitration, the disputed material may be admitted."  The 
arbitrator concluded that the Union had had prior knowledge of 
the talk-to's and that therefore, they were admissible.  The 
Union's prior knowledge was critical to the arbitrator's decision 
because it was an integral part of the issue submitted for 
arbitration.  The parties do not dispute the disposition of the 
specific submission. 
 The arbitrator, however, captiously decided another 
question that was neither submitted nor authorized, paragraph one 
of his award.  That paragraph provided: 
 
 1. On the general question of admissibility 
of talk-to's and the like before the Joint 
Panel where the Union members object, the 
ruling is that such material may not be 
admitted over the objection of the Union 
members. 
 
 This conflicts with paragraph two,9 exceeds the scope 
of the submission and does not draw its essence from the parties 
collective bargaining agreement.  Thus, I believe that paragraph 
one of the arbitrator's award must be vacated, the judgment of 
the district court reversed, and the case remanded to the 
                     
    
9Paragraph two's finding that the talk-to's are admissible 
makes no sense in light of paragraph one's conclusion that talk- 
to's are never admissible if the Union objects.  Judge Roth cites 
this inconsistency as support for her conclusion that paragraph 
one refers only to talk-to's which the Union does not know about 
prior to the hearing. 
 I believe that the plain language of these two paragraphs 
reveals an inherent inconsistency and that the only way to 
eliminate that inconsistency is to vacate paragraph one. 
  
district court with directions to enter summary judgment on 
behalf of the appellant.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
 I. 
 In paragraph one, the arbitrator plainly states that 
talk-to's are never admissible over the Union member's objection.  
The district court,10 UPS and the Union all read paragraph one to 
apply to all talk-to's, regardless of Union knowledge, and so do 
I.  The majority states that a broad "interpretation of paragraph 
one of the award is not suggested by the language of the award 
itself." (Maj. Op. at 8).  However, paragraph one's clear 
statement that "[talk-to's] may not be admitted over the 
objection of the Union members" supports this interpretation.  
Paragraph one makes no reference to Union knowledge or lack 
thereof; it directs a broad prohibition. 
 The arbitrator's opinion eliminates any doubt that 
paragraph one may be limited to cases of Union ignorance when it 
states: "The Union panel members could in a specific future case 
simply object to the introduction of `talk-to's' as such, without 
regard to the prior processing or handling of such material, and 
. . . this would be sufficient to bar the introduction of such 
material." App. at 61.  The majority quotes this language, states 
that it is ambiguous and concludes that "when an award does not 
apparently exceed the scope of the parties' submission, it will 
                     
    
10Specifically, the district court characterized paragraph 
one as saying, "that `talk-to's' are never admissible if the 
Union objects."Opn. at 8. 
  
be affirmed, regardless of inferences that may be drawn from the 
accompanying opinion."  Maj. Op. at 8 (citing United Steelworkers 
of Am., 363 U.S. at 598).  However, paragraph one, as read by the 
district court, the parties, and me, facially exceeds the scope 
of the parties' submission.  Thus, the majority cannot simply 
dismiss the language in the arbitrator's opinion which supports a 
broad reading of paragraph one as being ambiguous. 
 The district court upheld paragraph one, despite 
concluding that paragraph one encompassed all talk-to's, 
regardless of Union knowledge.  It concluded that the submission 
was not limited to situations where the Union was ignorant of the 
talk-to's and that therefore, paragraph one did not exceed the 
scope of the submission.  The majority turns the district court's 
reasoning on its head.  It rejects the district court's broad 
reading of the submission, as I believe it must.  However, it 
upholds the award because it baldly assumes that paragraph one 
only applies to situations where the Union is ignorant of talk-
to's prior to the hearing. 
 The majority supports its holding by assuming that the 
arbitrator's award addresses "only those talk-to's of which the 
Union did not have prior knowledge . . ." because that was the 
only issue submitted for arbitration.  Maj. Op. at 8.  It seems 
to me that this reasoning is circular.  The majority states that 
the award cannot exceed the submission because the submission is 
narrow and therefore that this court must assume that the award 
  
is narrow.  The majority justifies ignoring paragraph one's 
language and the arbitrator's opinion by making an unwarranted 
assumption.  The majority offers no authority for assuming that 
paragraph one is narrow, nor does it explain why the district 
court's, the Union's and UPS's broad reading of paragraph one is 
incorrect.  The majority concludes that: 
 the arbitrator's award, on its face, does not 
contain any language indicating that it 
extends beyond the scope of the question 
presented.  Rather paragraph one is logically 
read as a direct response to the parties' 
submission, pertaining only to talk-to's 
about which the Union had no prior knowledge. 
 
Maj. Op. at 8-9. 
 
 But where is the logic?  The majority offers no support 
for its "logical" conclusion.  To the majority, it is logical 
only because of its unwarranted assumptions.  I believe that, 
contrary to the majority's "logical" reading, paragraph one of 
the arbitrator's award broadly rules against the admission of 
talk-to's.  It therefore exceeds the scope of the issue submitted 
for arbitration, serves no useful purpose, and is wholly 
unnecessary to the unchallenged disposition of the issue 
submitted for arbitration. 
 II. 
 The majority correctly notes that an arbitrator's award 
will be upheld so long as it draws its essence from the 
collective bargaining agreement unless the award is tainted by 
fraud or bias or addresses matters outside the arbitrator's 
  
authority.  The majority concludes that pragraph one of the award 
draws its essence from the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement and therefore, upholds it. I respectfully disagree. 
 The arbitrator does not satisfactorily explain why he 
needed to make paragraph one's broad ruling.  The specific limits 
of the submission and the conflict between paragraphs one and two 
of his award belie his claim that it was necessary to resolve 
paragraph one before he could resolve paragraph two. 
 Under paragraph one of the award, a single Union member 
would have the right to bar evidence submitted at a hearing.  
This is contrary to the rules of procedure established under the 
basic collective bargaining agreement between the parties.  The 
1990-93 National Master United Parcel Services Agreement and the 
Central Pennsylvania Supplement provides that a hearing panel 
will be composed of four members, two appointed by the Union, and 
two appointed by UPS and that the panel's majority decision will 
bind the parties.  The members of this joint Union and company 
panel sit as neutrals and attempt to equitably resolve disputes.  
In creating the panel, the parties struck an even balance of 
power with management and the Union having equal representation.  
Under this system, decisions are made upon majority vote, or if 
deadlocked are sent to an outside arbitrator for resolution. The 
essence of the panel structure under the agreement is that panel 
decisions are by majority vote.  
  
 Article 48 of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement specifically prohibits an arbitrator from modifying 
that agreement.11   By allowing a single Union member to bar 
evidence from a proceeding, the arbitrator has overturned the 
majority concept of the panel structure and fundamentally altered 
the parties' agreement.  The parties bargained for equal power on 
the panel.  Paragraph one of the arbitrator's award shifts the 
balance of power towards the Union and upsets the parties' 
bargained-for equality.  In so doing, the arbitrator's decision 
has the potential to undermine the parties' entire grievance and 
arbitration procedure. 
 Paragraph one of the arbitrator's award violates the 
essence of the parties' collective bargaining agreement by 
depriving the parties of their contractual right to have an 
arbitrator resolve deadlocks on evidentiary disputes over the 
admissibility of "talk-to's."  Accordingly, this court should 
reverse the district court's decision and remand with directions 
to enter summary judgment on UPS's behalf. 
 III. 
 Instead of putting to rest a simple procedural issue, 
the arbitrator has unilaterally raised questions that have the 
potential to generate labor unrest between the parties.  
                     
    
11Article 48, § 2 of the basic collective bargaining 
agreement provides in pertinent part that an arbitrator "shall 
not have the authority to amend or modify this Agreement or 
establish new terms . . . under the Agreement." 
  
Paragraph one of the arbitrator's award exceeds the scope of the 
submission, violates the essences of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement and should be vacated.12  I therefore 
respectfully dissent. 
                     
    
12The appellant on appeal also contends that paragraph one of 
the arbitrator's award should be vacated because it violates "a 
well-defined dominant public policy."  I see no need to reach 
that issue and I therefore do not discuss it. 
